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ABSTRACT: This article proposes a method for developing a
NATO deployable police command capable of responding to
international crisis situations within 5 days and providing a stability
police force of 1,000 officers to support local forces in 30 days.

T

he North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recognizes
national security depends on regional stability.1 As the Alliance
analyzes deteriorating security conditions around the world, it
appears less likely to engage in overt peer-to-peer warfare but rather to
respond to gray-zone actions used by revisionist powers to change the
international order without provoking conventional war.2 Mechanisms
to identify and to counter these efforts to harm or interfere in civil
security, communications, civility, or elections do not currently exist.
But well-trained police forces and internal security organizations, not
military forces, may offer the best response.3 Many police organizations
are incapable of providing the necessary protections against gray-zone
activities. Nonetheless, NATO may be able to conduct crisis management
better by establishing a deployable police command.4
The United Nations recognizes police officers are equal to, if not
more important than, military forces in establishing security: “Good
soldiers . . . cannot fully perform police duties among local populations.” 5
This philosophy is reflected in the three separate but equal components
of the integrated United Nations (UN) mission: the military, the police,
and the civilians.6 Military commanders today are rarely responsible
for implementing the police portions of the UN Security Council
Resolution; hence, policing must be delegated to another organization.
As the UN security mission matures, the organization has removed
structural impediments to operational effectiveness, built upon the
1      Ruben Díaz-Plaja, “Projecting Stability: An Agenda for Action,” NATO, March 13, 2018.
2      Nathan P. Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2016); and Stanley Hoffman, “Clash of Globalizations,” Foreign Affairs
81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 104–15.
3      Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
4      Díaz-Plaja, “Projecting Stability.”
5      Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 107th Cong. 42 (2001) (General
Wesley Clark quoted in testimony of Robert M. Perito, Senior Fellow, Jennings Randolph Program
for International Peace, USIP).
6      International Forum for the Challenges for Peace Operations (Challenges Forum), Considerations
for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions (Stockholm, Sweden: Challenges Forum,
2010).
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successes made by the military component, and filled power vacuums
before they could be exploited by malevolent actors.7
But NATO has not changed its structure or its practices to
accommodate the increasingly important role of stability policing.
While stability police are recognized as necessary, they remain under
the authority of NATO. This article argues that NATO should develop a
deployable police command with police and justice personnel who have
been specially trained in stabilizing gray-zone conflicts.

Background

International interventions over the last two decades have
decreasingly focused on confronting conventional threats from
traditional armies and have increasingly responded to decentralized,
nonstate actors applying unconventional, asymmetrical, and irregular
tactics. Army stability tasks frequently “coordinate with other
instruments of national power” in such circumstances “to maintain
or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential
government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and
humanitarian relief.8
Traditional military forces, which are ill-suited for this shift to postwar
stability operations and operations other than war, have struggled to
operate within the “fog and friction” created when multiple participants
coordinate conventional and asymmetric capabilities. When combined,
megatrends—such as shifting socioeconomic conditions, accelerated
urbanization, rising geographic mobility, increased connectedness—
and rising criminal activities—such as weapons and drug trades, human
trafficking, murder, and politically motivated violence—will further
erode the capability of states to secure and govern themselves.9
International responses to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq
illustrate how stability operations suffer when a variety of approaches
are incongruously applied. Thus, the effectiveness of police response
to violence, crime, and disorder determines whether the people will
support a new government, and predetermines the success, failure,
or sustainability of an operation.10 Notably, disagreements and a lack
of coordination generate incoherent and ineffective stabilization

  7      Michael Dziedzic, ed., Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace (New York:
Roman & Littlefield, 2016).
8      Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Stability, Army Doctrine Publication
3-07 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012), 1.
9      World Economic Forum (WEF), The Global Risks Report 2018, 13th ed. (Geneva: WEF,
2018), 62.
10      Ian Johnstone, “Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations,” in Annual Review of Global Peace
Operations, 2006 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006); David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, The
Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010).
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actions, disconnect program efforts, duplicate training resources, and
inappropriately prepare police for operations.11
For successful stability policing operations, a lead agency must
be established to coordinate training and to provide the police assets
required to quell crimes and manage public order.12 As demonstrated in
Afghanistan and Iraq, stability policing operations should not be treated
as secondary priorities for military interventions. Instead, they must be
regarded as equal, if not more important, requirements for long-term
stabilization.13 America’s emphasis on the military as the main security
actor, as well as the subsequent neglect of police forces, is, in hindsight,
a major shortcoming of these early interventions.14
To make the situation worse, local police forces in both Iraq and
Afghanistan were inadvertently militarized when they were trained
as counterinsurgency assets.15 In the aftermath of a crisis, the local
police must investigate crime, manage public order, use intelligence-led
policing to reestablish the rule of law, counter terrorism, and combat
organized crime. Yet police cannot be the main instrument for fighting
insurgency. As experts such as Joshua Bachner explain, “Military and
police serve very different functions and ideally should not serve the
role of the other.” 16
Policymakers recognize these problems. But despite continuing
improvements, the existing system still has several drawbacks. As the
US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction observed,
“Developing and training a national police force is best accomplished
by law enforcement professionals in order to achieve a police capability
focused on community policing and criminal justice.” 17 Likewise, a senior
UN official, stated before the intervention in Kosovo in 2000, police
forces must improve the rule of law and break the cycle of impunity
of those who have committed acts of violence.18 This is especially true
in forced regime changes. The ability of the police to manage crime,
violence, and disorder will determine whether or not the population will
support the new government and the new regime.19 Stability policing
11      James Wither and Thilo Schroeter, Police Primacy: The Challenges of Developing Host Nation Police
Capacity on Stability Operations, Occasional Paper 22 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C.
Marshall Center for European Security Studies, 2012), 1–5; and John F. Sopko, Reconstructing the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-1762-LL (Arlington, VA: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2017), 120–31.
12     Dennis E. Keller, U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst
Option To Fill the US Capacity Gap (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010); and Wither and
Schroeter, Police Primacy, 4.
13      Sopko, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense, 120–22.
14      Felix Heiduk, “Rethinking ‘Policebuilding,’ ” Cooperation and Conflict 50, no. 1 (2015): 69–86.
15      Sopko, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense, 123–25.
16      Joshua Bachner, The Flip Side of the COIN: The US Role in Stability Operations (thesis, Princeton
University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2013), 76.
17      Sopko, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense, 177.
18      “In Remarks on Behalf of Secretary-General, His Kosovo Special Representative, Bernard
Kouchner, Condemns Murder of Defenceless Farmers,” SG/SM/7077, United Nations, July
26, 1999.
19      Heiduk, “Rethinking ‘Policebuilding’,” 73; Bachner, Flip Side, 84; and Wither and Schroeter,
Police Primacy, 4.
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therefore becomes a legitimization of the intervention, especially from
the perspective of the population.
The police force in the stability operation will also have to bridge
the gap between military and local police forces to assume duties not
clearly set in either camp—an area known as the security gap. Such
gaps may arise outside of traditional postconflict stability operations
when law and order break down and public order must be immediately
reestablished to save lives. A tsunami, for example, could reduce the
number of available security forces, or massive protests may exceed the
state’s security capabilities. Thus, the state may ask outsiders to intervene.

Stability Policing

Most opinions on this topic indicate the best asset to fulfill the
security gap is a Carabinieri-like constabulary force that can prevent power
vacuums and anarchy.20 Only such robust policing organizations with
military status capable of performing specialized missions in disciplined
groups can overcome the three distinct public security challenges
plaguing stability operations: the deployment gap, the enforcement
gap, and the institutional sustainability gap.21 Temporal deployment
gaps, which can have profound negative consequences on missions,
result from a lag time between the arrival of the military contingent
and the fielding of operational contingents. Enforcement gaps refer to
discrepancies between the availability of lethal force in a combat unit
and the minimal level of force available to an individual police officer.
Institutional sustainability involves the government’s incapacity to
establish and sustain the rule of law.22
Some parties can readily see a role for military police forces (MPs)
in future stability operations.23 But critics contend such forces are illsuited to perform stability policing operations for several reasons. First,
MPs must perform other important duties during military operations,
which leaves an inadequate number of units and personnel available to
fulfill both functions. Second, servicemembers charged with stability
policing generally lack expertise and experience in peacetime civilian
law enforcement capacities, such as community-based policing.24
Specifically, military police forces can only be successful at
determining the local community’s threats to NATO or coalition forces.25
Military police officers conducting stability operations experience
a radical change of ethics, values, mentality, and procedures as they
develop the flexibility and heuristics to handle complex social problems
20      Bachner, Flip Side, 85.
21      Dziedzic, Criminalized Power Structures.
22      Bachner, Flip Side, 85; and Michael J. Dziedzic, The Public Security Challenges and International
Stability Police Units (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, n.d.).
23      Ronja Kempin and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, “Gendarmerieeinheinten” in Internationalen
Stabiliseungsmissione: eine Option fur Deutshland?, SWP-Study 2010/S 06 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, March 2010).
24      Keller, U.S. Military Forces, xiii–ix, 25.
25      Keller, U.S. Military Forces, 25.
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they would otherwise have limited exposure to. Likewise, interactions
with the population during stability operations generally intersect with
law enforcement problems, which generate biases that MPs rarely have
the opportunity to resolve in a conflict environment. Thus, military
operations to quell insurgencies and enforce stability often provoke
controversy among local populations.
Finally, though military police may understand the nuances between
the use of force and the rules of engagement better than other soldiers,
their nature and their training remain focused on combat. A police force
serves and protects; a military is trained to conquer and defend using
maximal force. Conversely, a population’s opinions of the military are
often tainted by a concept of tyrannical force that makes comprehending
military police officers as partners of the people difficult.26
Regardless of the pitfalls, the United Nations has discovered there
are not enough military police officers available to meet the growing
demand for stability police units.27 Using military police in conjunction
with stability police may therefore be necessary, ideally only for a short
period of time and a limited number of tasks. The blending of the two
forces can, for a short duration, alleviate personnel shortages while
mitigating some of the concerns inherent in an all-military force. It
should be noted, however, that the UN does not accept military police
in the police component of UN operations unless they are police forces
with military status.28

Figure 1. Organizational chart for NATO Deployable Police Command

26      Bachner, Flip Side, 70–84.
27       Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPO), Standard Operation Procedure (Revised):
Assessment of Operational Capability of Formed Police Units for Service in United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations and Special Political Missions, Ref. 2017.9 (New York: United Nations, 2017).
28      DPO, Standard Operation Procedure, 6.
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A Deployable NATO Police Command

To support local police reforms during a regional crisis while
mitigating costs to the United States and the European Union, NATO
should establish a deployable police command. This command would
guarantee NATO could react quickly, fill security gaps, offer common
and integrated doctrine and approaches, and set force standards that
could apply under different oversights, such as the European Union or
the United Nations. Given the prevalence and the increasing capability
of criminal networks, these forces will need a creative combination of
community policing, constabulary work, criminal investigation, and
special branch work.
The commander should lead a rule of law unit composed of a
headquarters; approximately 300 experts divided into groups of legal,
government, and political advisors; a training unit; special operations
units; stability policing units; a special investigative group, and a special
weapons and tactics group. It should be capable of deploying within 5
days and of reaching a full operational capability of 1,000–4,000 police
officers—with forces from such nations as Italy, France, and Spain—in
30 days. The latter response time is a goal of the European Gendarmerie
Force for similar forces responding outside of the European Union
that NATO could achieve by combining existing units on a rotational
basis.29 With 3 police officers per 1,000 people sufficient in a high-threat
environment, the international force should be capable of deploying up
to as many as 4,000 police officers.30
By including public prosecutors and judicial authorities in the
deployable police command, NATO could assure and legitimize
transitional justice and establish a criminal justice system to help maintain
law and order. Such efforts could prevent mayhem in postconflict or
regime-change scenarios when judicial and legal authorities often become
broken, nonexistent, or corrupt.31 A mixed domestic and international
tribunal could also pursue mass atrocities, guarantee human rights,
uphold the rule of law, implement curfews, and most of all, guarantee an
independent, fair, and lawful process to indicted people. Similar hybrid
courts have already been used in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone
to great effect.32 These interventions have taught that focusing only on
police is shortsighted because legitimacy is threatened when corrupt
judges release convicted offenders, corrections officers abuse detained
inmates, or poor prison conditions threaten prisoners’ well-being.

29      Michiel de Weger, The Potential of the European Gendarmerie Force (The Hague: Netherlands
Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009), 9.
30      “State of Crime and Criminal Justice Worldwide,” A/CONF.213/3 (report, 12th United
Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Salvador, Brazil, April 12–19, 2010), 19.
31     David T. Armitage Jr. and Anne M. Moisan, “Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition:
The Euro-Atlantic Dimension,” Strategic Forum 218 (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University, November 2005).
32      Laura T. Dickinson, “Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: The promise of Mixed Tribunals,”
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 31, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 23–42.
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The team of government advisors should be high-ranking experts
who can assist a country’s ministries of interior and justice in developing
institutional guidance and coordinating support from the stability
policing operation and the stabilization mission. These advisors, in
coordination with tribunals and judicial authorities, should mentor
and monitor ministries, top officials, and their ancillary staffs on
police administration, community policing, and criminal justice. This
team should constantly link its work with mentoring, monitoring, and
advising units for local police forces to offer guidance, provide feedback,
and assist with implementing policies and procedures.
A social specialist, cultural heritage protection expert, legal advisor,
gender consultant, and strategic communication advisor constitute a
political advising team. The information about the operational scenario,
cultural and social setting, religious traditions, and ethic integration
provided by this team can be used to inform command decisions. The
commander can also share this information among the staff responsible
for planning, personnel management, administration, logistics,
communication, intelligence, and security. A doctrine and policy section
might also keep this information in mind as they promote best practices
and review current policies.
Highly trained experts with a clear track record of field work
experience in crisis areas comprise a training unit that mentors,
monitors, and advises. These specialists should be selected primarily
on the quality of the civilian policing experience they gained in their
respective countries. This team includes forensic laboratory experts,
counterterrorism advisors, investigation experts, public order specialists,
community policing officers, border guards, counternarcotics experts,
and sexual and gender criminologists who can equip the police cadre
with a comprehensive array of capabilities.
These experts should be devoted professionals capable of vetting
participants. Experience teaching, mentoring, and coaching police
officers, ideally as field training officers in an international mission, is
important to this team’s success—especially when local recruits may be
illiterate. In contrast to the shortsighted efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
other stability operations, experts estimate it can take at least five years
to create or to reform a law enforcement organization.33
To complete the command’s capability, a special operations
unit comprised of special investigators, Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) teams, and counterterrorism experts must be added. This unit is
necessary for protecting VIPs, capturing war criminals and terrorists, and
conducting high-threat police missions. Other paramount tasks include
conducting sensitive investigations, collecting intelligence, seizing
evidence, and supporting the training of local special investigations
units and SWAT teams.
33      Robert M. Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Stability
Force, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2013); and Wither and Schroeter,
Police Primacy, 3.

58

Parameters 49(1–2) Spring–Summer 2019

Conclusion

The most notable aspect that authorities and military commanders
must understand about building a stability police force is that large
numbers of novice police officers, swiftly equipped and hastily instructed,
are detrimental to the success of security and stabilization operations:
a competent police officer takes longer to train than a soldier. Areas
handed over to inadequately trained police officers can just as quickly
fall back into the hands of criminals or insurgents. Developing an
effective, community-based police force depends more on the values
and attitudes of the members of the force than the officers’ technical
skills. Unfortunately, developing technical skills is easier and generally
receives greater attention than reforming behaviors and attitudes.
During the last 20 years, the European Union, the United Nations,
and NATO have adopted different interpretations and models for
reforming police in crisis areas with mixed results. Political constraints
and policymakers’ inertia continue to have a negative impact on the
policing dimension of stability operations. Hopefully, the lessons learned
from their experiences can be institutionalized and more successes can
be achieved. Radical cultural and conceptual changes will be required
not only to implement effective policies but also to reorganize NATO’s
stability policing efforts. Recognizing police are essential to maintaining
stability and to consolidating gains made by the military, NATO must
create the organizational structure—a deployable police command—
required to maximize its effectiveness.
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